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Trade Integration and Political Turbulence:
Environmental Policy Consequences∗
Per G. Fredriksson and Muthukumara Mani

Abstract
This paper contributes to the unresolved issue regarding the effect of economic integration
on environmental policymaking. In particular, we discuss the joint impact of trade openness and
political stability on environmental policymaking. Our theory predicts that the effect of trade integration on environmental policy is conditional on the degree of political stability. Trade integration
affects the stringency of environmental policies due to changes in industry bribery behavior, and
the effect is conditional on the degree of political stability. The empirical findings support the theory and are robust to alternative specifications. The stringency enhancing effect on environmental
policy of trade integration is greater in politically stable countries.
KEYWORDS: Trade liberalization, environmental regulations, political instability, pollution haven,
trade policy
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This paper examines how increased economic integration influences the determination
of environmental policies in countries with unstable political regimes.
The relationship between trade policy and environmental policy and quality is an
unresolved issue in the scholarly and public debate. For example, Antweiler et al.
(2001) and Dean (2002) find that trade liberalization, on the whole, is likely to improve
environmental quality. Others argue that trade openness threatens environmental goals
(see Esty and Geradin, 1998). The current discussion on the effects of economic
integration on environmental policymaking has risen to the forefront of the public
debate in part due to the well-publicized protests at recent major trade negotiation
meetings (for example, at the WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999).1
Nonetheless, economic integration is progressing rapidly in several regions of the
world, for example in the southern cone of Latin America (MERCOSUR), Asia
(AFTA), North America (NAFTA), Europe (EU), and negotiations are under way for a
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). However, some fundamental questions are
still being asked, both in developed and developing economies, on the implications of
further economic integration. In particular, does trade liberalization affect governments’
ability to manage economic activity, i.e. does it limit governments’ freedom of action
on regulatory policies such as on the environment? If this would be the case, trade
liberalization would contribute to creating “pollution havens”.
When analyzing the effect of trade liberalization on environmental policymaking,
we believe it beneficial to take domestic political conditions into account. It is often
argued that political instability has large adverse economic and social effects, especially
in countries where the government is driven by short-term motives, supporting narrow
interest groups, and ignoring long-term costs (see, e.g., Rodrik, 1991).
While the effects of economic integration and political instability have been
studied in separate strands of the literature, no attempt has been made to study the
interaction between them (on economic integration see, for example, Fredriksson, 1999;
Antweiler et al., 2001; and Dean, 2002; on political instability see, for example, Bohn
and Deacon, 2000; Brett and Keen, 2000; and Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003).2 We
1

In the context of increasing globalization of capital flows, some observers have argued that gaps in
national environmental standards draw the most polluting industries to developing countries, creating
"pollution havens" and propelling a global "race to the bottom" in environmental standards (see Wilson,
1996, for a survey). Esty and Geradin (1998, p.7) argue that: “considerable evidence suggests that
government officials, facing the prospect of reduced sales, lost jobs and diminished investment in
domestic industries caused by competition with foreign companies whose costs are lower due to more lax
environmental requirements, often choose not to elevate environmental standards and sometimes even
relax enforcement of current standards.”
2
Antweiler et al. (2001) study the effect of trade openness on pollution levels, and show theoretically and
empirically the scale, composition, and technique effects of trade liberalization. In their study, all
countries will set stricter environmental policies due to real income increases following trade
liberalization, but the total effect depends on factor endowments. On average, the pollution levels decline,
however. Copeland (1994, 1996) investigates the welfare effects of trade and environmental policy
reforms, Copeland and Taylor (1994, 1995) discuss the linkages between income, pollution, and trade,
López (1997) analyzes the effect of trade liberalization on environmental resources (biomass) and
deforestation in Ghana, Rauscher (1994), Bommer and Schulze (1999), Fredriksson (1999), and Damania
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aim to close this gap in the literature. We seek to shed light on whether the effects of
trade openness and political stability reinforce each other, or whether their impacts
instead are opposed.
Our focus is on the impact of trade liberalization on the political forces forming
environmental policy, in particular in the presence of domestic political instability. Our
theoretical model builds on Bernheim and Whinston’s (1986) and Grossman and
Helpman’s (1994) common agency model, which recently has been extended to
environmental policymaking by, for example, Damania (2001).3 In our model, a lobby
group representing the polluting industry aims to influence the incumbent government’s
environmental policy choice by promising a bribe (or campaign contribution) in return
for a favorable policy decision. The incumbent government values both the bribe and
aggregate social welfare, and the relative weight on welfare is viewed as a useful
measure of government corruptibility.4 We focus the discussion on relatively dishonest
(corrupt) regimes, which put a great weight on bribes relative to social welfare.
In a three-stage small open economy model, we analyze the effects of economic
integration on the behavior of the incumbent government and a producer lobby group.
In the first stage, the government receives a bribe schedule by the lobby group, which
relates the size of the bribe to the attractiveness of the government’s environmental
policy choice. When formulating its bribe offer, the lobby takes the probability of
eventual policy implementation into account, i.e. the level of political stability. For
policy implementation to occur, the incumbent government must remain in power
throughout the (third) policy implementation stage. In the second stage, the government
chooses its optimal environmental policy, taking into account its own turnover
probability. It receives in return a bribe corresponding to its policy choice. In the third
stage, the environmental policy previously selected by the government is implemented,
given that it remains in power. The political crisis causing the departure of the
government could take the form of, for example, a coup d’etat or a vote of no

et al. (2003) study the effect of trade liberalization on environmental policymaking, the latter in the
presence of corruption. Hillman and Ursprung (1994) study the effect of environmental lobby groups on
trade and environmental policies. These papers ignore political stability, however. Bohn and Deacon
(2000) study the effect of ownership security (a function of political violence and instability) on
deforestation and oil extraction, Brett and Keen (2000) explore politicians’ incentive to earmark pollution
tax revenues in the presence of political uncertainty, and Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) study the
interaction between corruption and political instability on agricultural sector environmental policies. This
literature ignores the issue of trade liberalization. Thus, no previous study exists on the joint effects of
trade openness and political stability on environmental policymaking.
3
While several authors in the literature use the basic structure of Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) model
to study environmental and trade policies, the joint effects of trade integration and political instability
have not been analyzed using this common agency model.
4
While in some countries the transfer of funds to politicians is legal (e.g., campaign contributions from
political action committees in the U.S.), in this paper we view all monetary gifts to the government
corruption. Corruption here implies that the policy maker is willing to deviate from a welfare maximizing
policy in return for monetary gifts from a lobby group.
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confidence. If the incumbent government’s policy is not implemented, the lobby group
does not benefit from the bribe paid in the second stage.5
In this paper, we show that trade integration affects both the producer lobby’s and
the government’s incentives in the policy formation process, and that these incentives
are conditional on the degree of political stability.6 We find that trade integration in a
polluting sector has two effects on the pollution tax. First, as output falls, the lobby has
less at stake and its bribery effort declines accordingly. This “bribery reduction effect”
of trade integration causes the pollution tax to rise. Second, note that the government
has a welfare maximizing incentive to tax excess output and pollution created by
protection. This incentive declines as a result of trade integration, a “welfare effect”.
When the government is sufficiently dishonest (corrupt), the bribery reduction effect
dominates. In this case, trade integration raises the pollution tax. The model also
predicts that the effect of trade integration is conditional on the degree of political
stability.
Since political instability reduces both the lobby’s incentive to seek influence, and
the government’s incentive to deliver welfare, the changes in the intensities of these
motives resulting from trade integration are moderated by political instability. In the
limit when political stability is extremely low, trade integration has close to no effect on
environmental policy, because both the bribery and welfare effects of trade integration
are negligible. This is a novel finding in the literature, to our knowledge.
The prediction generated by the model is evaluated using cross-country data from
92 non-OECD and 26 OECD countries. Our empirical work supports our theory, since
we find that trade openness is associated with more stringent environmental policy. This
suggests that the “bribery reduction effect” dominates the “welfare effect”. We also find
that the marginal effect of openness is conditional on the degree of political stability. In
particular, the stringency enhancing effect of trade integration on environmental policy
is greater in more stable countries. Our empirical results are robust to several
alternative measures of the degree of economic integration and political stability. We
believe they may serve to inform the policy debate of the likely effects on
environmental policymaking of further trade integration.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 sets up the theoretical model and
Section 2 discusses the effects of trade integration and political stability on
environmental policy. Section 3 presents our empirical model and data, and Section 4
discusses the empirical results. Section 5 offers a brief conclusion.

5

In other words, bribe payments are not conditional on the policy being implemented and there is no
legal recourse forcing the return of given bribes. Another implicit assumption is that a government
dislodged from power will not seek reelection, and hence has no incentive to either placate the lobby or
address welfare questions (see also Coate and Morris, 1999).
6
Rose (2004) reports that GATT/WTO members do not appear to be more open to international trade,
and we therefore disregard the possibility that reductions in trade barriers are reciprocal.
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1. The Model
A small open economy has two sectors. The “clean” sector produces a
numeraire good z, and the polluting sector produces a good x. The economy is
populated by two types of individuals, consumers (denoted by S) and factor owners (F).
The two population groups are of size s and f, respectively, and the population is
normalized to 1. We assume that the factor owners are a highly concentrated group such
that their share of the population is approximately zero, i.e. f=0 and s =1. All individuals
have labor income, factor owners in addition have factor income from ownership of a
sector-specific factor. The consumers derive disutility from the pollution associated
with the local production. An individual k, k=S,F, has a utility given by7
(1)

U k = c zk + u k (c xk ) − δ S θX ,

where czk and cxk are consumption of the numeraire good z and good x by a type k, with
world market prices equal to 1 and pw, respectively. The world market price pw is
exogenously given as the country is a price taker. u(cxk ) is a strictly concave and
differentiable sub-utility function. δ S is an indicator variable which takes a value of
one if the individual is a consumer, and zero otherwise.8 While s is defined as the share
of consumers in the total population, it is also the marginal disutility of pollution, since
the share s has disutility 1 and the others have disutility 0. Production of x is given by X,
and θ is the per-unit damage function. The government regulates pollution by levying a
pollution tax t∈T, T⊂ℜ, on each unit of damage from polluting production activities. If
the polluting sector is import-competing (exporting), it benefits from an ad-valorem
import tariff (export subsidy), τ . 9 Whereas the pollution tax is set by the government
(relatively few pollutants are covered by international agreements), the tariff is assumed
determined entirely by multilateral trade negotiations which this small country
government is unable to influence. All individuals thus take the tariff rate as given.10
Let subscripts denote partial derivatives. The per-unit damage is a function of the
amount of abatement, A, carried out per unit of output, such that θ = θ ( A), where
θ A < 0, and θ AA > 0.
An individual k spending Yk consumes cxk=d(pw(1+τ))=uc-1 and czk=Ykpw(1+τ)d(pw(1+τ)), where d(.) is the demand function for good x. Thus, the indirect
7

Corner solutions may result with quasi-linear preferences. We assume interior solutions, however.
Our results would be unaltered if we assumed that factor owners also suffered disutility from pollution,
as long as they remain in favor of a lower pollution tax. We opt to keep the model as simple as possible.
9
From now on we discuss only the import-competition (tariff) case, since import competing sectors
generally receive more protection. Identical results hold in the case of an exporting sector with an export
subsidy. Note that export taxes are illegal in some countries, for example the U.S. We therefore ignore the
issue of export taxes, although we recognize that they are used in some developing countries.
10
The exogeneity assumption is supported by our empirical findings, see Section 3 below. Moreover, as
pointed out by Ederington (2000), the success of GATT negotiations in reducing worldwide tariff barriers
has resulted in a shift of attention to domestic policy instruments as secondary trade barriers.
8
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utility function of a consumer is expressed as VS(pw,τ,YS)=YS+C(pw(1+τ))-θX, where
C(pw(1+τ))= u[d(pw(1+τ))]-pw(1+τ)d(pw(1+τ)) is the consumer surplus derived from
consumption of good x. There is no consumer surplus from consumption of good z.
Each individual has a unit of labor and the total labor endowment equals l. Good z
is produced by labor alone with a constant returns to scale technology, and an inputoutput coefficient equal to one. The labor supply is sufficiently large for the supply of
this good to be positive which implies a wage rate equal to one. The inputs into
production of good x are labor and a sector-specific factor. The technology is constant
returns to scale. Ignoring labor costs, producers of good x face a net price given
by p = p w (1 + τ ) - tθ ( A) − A, and the specific factor reward depends entirely on the
producer's net price, p, i.e. π ( p). The first-order condition with respect to abatement
equals π A = − X (tθ A + 1) = 0, which in turn is used to find At = −θ A /(tθ AA ) > 0. The
supply curve for good x is given by Hotelling’s Lemma, i.e. X ( p) = π p ( p ), where
Xp > 0,

and

X pp = 0. 11

Imports

of

the

polluting

good

are

given

by

M ( p) = p w [d ( p w (1 + τ )) − X ( p)] . Net aggregate tax and tariff revenues are given by
(2)

R(t , τ ) = tθX ( p ) + τM ( p),

and are assumed distributed equally to all individuals as lump-sum.
The income obtained by the owners of the sector-specific factor depends on the
environmental policy (as well as on trade policy). Factor owners are assumed able to
organize into a lobby group that coordinates a prospective bribe offer to the incumbent
government. The consumers are assumed to face sufficiently severe free-riding
problems to be unable to organize political action (see Olson, 1965). The model defines
a three-stage game between the government and the lobby. Both players are risk neutral.
The timing assumptions are as follows:
Stage 1. In stage one the lobby group offers the incumbent government a bribe
schedule Λ(t). The lobby’s strategy hence consists of a continuous function
Λ(t ) :T → ℜ , i.e., it offers a specific bribe for selecting a policy t. The lobby faces
uncertainty on whether the incumbent government will remain in power long enough
for the lobby to reap a reward to its bribe (policy implementation occurs only in stage
three). In stage one, the lobby assigns a probability 0 < γ < 1 that the government will
remain in office, and a probability (1 − γ ) that it will thrown out. Thus, γ is a measure
of the degree of political stability. All players also assign a probability 0 < λ < 1 that the
chosen policy is implemented by the new government, in the event the incumbent leaves
office early.12 We make a simplifying assumption about this parameter. Assumption 1:
The probability λ is small.13
11

This assumption simplifies the presentation of our theoretical results, but does not change them.
Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) make an identical assumption. For example, the new government
may have other policy priorities before the next election, the process of hiring new officials in charge of

12
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Stage 2. In the second stage the incumbent government proceeds to set its optimal
environmental policy, given the lobby group’s strategy. The government also collects
the associated bribe from the producer lobby.14 Bribes are used for the incumbent
politicians’ personal consumption during this stage.
Stage 3. In the third stage, the selected policy is implemented, given that the
incumbent government remains in power, or in the event that the successor keeps the
policy selected by its predecessor. Producers determine output and abatement levels.
Turnover could occur, for example, because of a vote of no confidence, or a coup
attempt. From the lobby’s perspective in stage one, policy implementation occurs with a
probability γ + (1 − γ )λ . This is the probability that all policy-favors “purchased” by the
lobby will be delivered. With a probability (1 − γ )(1 − λ ) the incumbent is removed
from office and the policy is not implemented.15 For simplicity, the game between the
lobby and the incumbent simply ends here in this event. Since the challenger did not
receive a bribe within the period, it is not committed to its predecessor’s policy
promises, although it may choose to implement its predecessor’s policy choice. In the
event the challenger decides to change the predecessor’s environmental policy in stage
three, the new government is assumed to set an exogenous tax tc, until a new lobbying
game starts between itself and the lobby.
The lobby takes the political stability level into account in its formulation of its
bribe schedule. The gross (indirect) utility of the lobby group is therefore given by the
expected value of specific factor income,
(3)

E[ΩF (t,τ )] ≡ π ( p)[γ + (1− γ )λ] + π ( p c )(1− γ )(1− λ),

where E[.] is the expectations operator and π ( p ) is aggregate factor income. This
factor income is received in the event that the policy determined by the incumbent
materializes. Since f = 0, the lobby ignores tax and tariff revenues, as well as
consumer surplus (it receives a negligible share). If the incumbent government is
carrying out environmental policy and the process of agenda setting may involve delays, or the
government may want to avoid that environmental policy becomes an election issue. Thus, we view the
new government as having an objective function identical to the incumbent, but due to some exogenous
circumstance it may delay the taking of bribes in return for environmental policy choices.
13
This assumption implicitly implies that the new government must care sufficiently about receiving a
bribe in return for setting environmental policy.
14
Neither the lobby group, nor the government, is assumed to renege on their promises in the second or
third stages. Since corrupt government politicians likely have a monopoly on selling policy favors, it
appears plausible that they have a relatively great bargaining power, and are able to demand that a bribe
must be paid before any industry friendly policy action is taken. Our timing assumption also sharpens the
focus on the considerate resources that industry groups invest in political connections and bribery, which
is supported by empirical evidence.
15
We abstract from possible strategic choices by the lobby, and we do not model the bribery game
between the lobby and the new government. While it would be preferable to include the new
government’s actions into the model, we opt to keep it as simple as possible and thus focus on the
incumbent government policy choice only.
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removed and the successor chooses a different policy, the lobby’s exogenous factor
income equals π ( p c ), where pc = pw(1+τ) - tcθ(A)-A.
The incumbent government values bribes and aggregate social welfare. Bribes
are used for personal consumption, and social welfare is of relevance because the
incumbent is more likely to win future re-election, the greater is average welfare.
However, aggregate welfare is assumed of value to the incumbent government only if it
stays in office. The incumbent government’s policy choice influences its own welfare
only if it stays in power, in which case aggregate social welfare is given by
(4)

w
A
Ω (t , τ ) ≡ π ( p) + l + C ( p (1 + τ )) + R(t , τ ) − sθX ( p),

which expresses the sum of all individuals’ aggregate factor rewards, labor income,
consumer surplus, tax and tariff revenues, take the consumers’ aggregate disutility from
pollution. Note that taking the first-order condition of the expression for aggregate
social welfare, (4), yields the second-best tax, t * = s + τp w X pθ (θ 2 X p − θ A At X ) > s,
where s is the first-best pigouvian tax (i.e., under free trade). Since the presence of a
tariff stimulates output, the optimal tax exceeds the marginal disutility of pollution, s. If
the incumbent government loses power, it has no interest in aggregate social welfare,
and from the incumbent government’s point of view it equals zero.
The incumbent government thus has an objective function equal to
(5)

E[ I (t ,τ )] ≡ Λ(t ) + hγΩ A (t ,τ ),

a weighed sum of the bribe and the expected aggregate social welfare. The exogenous
parameter h is the government’s weight on welfare relative to bribes, which in our view
reflects the degree of government honesty (absence of corruption). In our model, the
bribe aims to influence government policy and not elections (see also Schulze and
Ursprung, 2001; Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003). López and Mitra (2000) employ a
similar formulation in their investigation of the effect of corruption on the relationship
between income and environmental quality. The government trades off the size of the
bribe (which it enjoys with probability 1) with the expected value of aggregate social
welfare.
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the well-known model by Grossman
and Helpman (1994) can be found using two necessary conditions:
(i)

t ° = arg max Λ° (t ) + hγΩ A (t ,τ ) on Τ ;

(ii)

t ° = arg max[Ω F (t ,τ ) − Λ° (t )] + [Λ° (t ) + hγΩ A (t ,τ )] on Τ .

t

t

The equilibrium pollution tax policy t ° simultaneously maximizes the
government’s utility function [condition (i)] and the joint utility of the lobby and the
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incumbent [condition (ii)], given the turnover probability. The equilibrium
characterization is found by taking the first-order conditions of (i) and (ii), which yields
(6)

Λ°t (t ° ) + hγΩ tA (t ° ,τ ) = 0,

and
(7)

[Ω tF (t ° ,τ ) − Λ°t (t ° )] + [Λ°t (t ° ) + hγΩ tA (t ° ,τ )] = 0.

Substituting (6) into (7) yields Ω tF (t ° ,τ ) = Λ°t (t ° ), which reflects the fact that the bribe
schedule is locally truthful, as discussed by Grossman and Helpman (1994). The
characterization of the equilibrium pollution tax is found by substituting this condition
into (6), which yields
(8)

Ω tF (t ° ,τ ) + hγΩ tA (t ° ,τ ) = 0.

Differentiation of equations (3) and (4) with respect to the pollution tax yields
(9)

Ω tF (t ,τ ) = −θX (γ + (1 − γ )λ ),

and
(10)

Ω tA (t ,τ ) = (t − s )(θ A At X − θ 2 X p ) + τp w X pθ .

Substituting expressions (9) and (10) into equation (8), and rearranging, we find an
explicit expression for the equilibrium characterization given by
(11)

− θX [γ + (1 − γ )λ ] + hγ [(t D − s )(θ A At X − θ 2 X p ) + τp w X pθ ] = 0.


A

B

Note that the second term in (11) is adjusted by γ , rather than (γ + (1 − γ )λ ),
since the incumbent government does not benefit from its policy choice in the event it
leaves office. Note also that the equilibrium tax rate t D is smaller than the second-best
tax, which the government would choose in the absence of instability and lobbying.
Since term A in (11) is negative, term B is positive, which holds only if
t D < s + τp w X pθ (θ 2 X p − θ A At X ).

http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/vol4/iss2/art1
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2. Trade Integration and Political Stability

We now analyze the effects of trade integration on environmental policymaking,
accounting for political stability. Note that “trade integration” in our analysis is
identical to a cut in the tariff rate. The aim is to derive testable hypotheses for our
empirical work carried out in the subsequent sections. We find the following
proposition.
Proposition 1: (i) In equilibrium, trade integration unambiguously causes the pollution
tax rate to rise when (a) the degree of government honesty is low, or (b)
( s − t )θ A At > θ ; (ii) The effect is conditional on the degree of political stability. For
sufficiently low government honesty, the effect is increasing in political stability.
Proof: (i) Differentiation of Eqn. (11) with respect to the tariff equals
∂t
=
∂τ
D

(12)

A
B




{θ [γ + (1 − γ )λ ] − hγ [(t − s )θ A At + θ ]} X p p w

D

,

where D = θ 2 X p [γ + (1 − γ )λ ] + hγψ , and where ψ ≡ {(θ A At X − θ 2 X p ) +
(t − s )[ X (θ AA At2 + θ A Att ) − 3θθ A At X p ] + τp w X pθ A At )}.

D

is

the

second-order

condition of the government’s maximization (8), which is required to be negative for a
maximum. We assume this to be the case, which requires ψ < 0. The denominator of
(12) is consequently negative. In the numerator, term A is positive, whereas term B is
ambiguous in sign. We have two cases: (a) Term B is positive. For sufficiently low
values of honesty, h, (equivalent to sufficiently high corruption), such that
h < θ [γ + (1 − γ )λ ] {γ [(t − s )θ A At + θ ]} , the numerator is positive and thus expression
(12) is negative. Trade integration leads to an increase in the pollution tax if
government honesty is sufficiently low. (b) Term B is negative. In this case, (12) is
unambiguously negative for all values of h. Thus, trade integration leads to an increase
in the pollution tax.
(ii) Differentiation of (12) yields
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B


∂ 2t D
=
∂τ∂γ
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{θ (1 − λ ) − h[(t − s )θ A At + θ ]} X p p w
A


D



I

(13)



C
E




(θ 2 X p (1 − λ ) + hψ ){θ [γ + (1 − γ )λ ] − hγ [(t − s )θ A At + θ ]} X p p w
F

−

D



2

.

II

The sign of (13) is indeterminate. We seek to evaluate the sign of (13), focusing on
parts I and II separately (one at a time). The focus is on the role of h and cases where
(13) is negative. Part I: (a) If term A in the numerator is negative, term B is
unambiguously positive for all values of h. (b) If term A is positive, term B in the
numerator
is
positive
for
sufficiently
low
honesty,
such
that
h < θ (1 − λ ) /[(t − s )θ A At + θ ] . Part II: Term C is positive (negative) for
h < (>)θ 2 X p (λ − 1) / ψ .

Term

E

is

positive

(negative)

if

h < (>)θ [γ + (1 − γ )λ ] / γ [(t − s )θ A At + θ ], when [(t − s )θ A At + θ ] > 0. Term E is
unambiguously positive when [(t − s )θ A At + θ ] < 0. Term F is positive if sign (term C)
= sign (term E).
Expression (13) shows how the effect of trade openness on the pollution tax
D
(∂t / ∂τ ) is affected by a change in political stability, γ . For sufficiently low honesty h,
terms B, C, and E are positive, yielding a negative sign of (13). In this case (see part (i)
of the proposition), greater political stability raises the effect of trade integration on the
pollution tax. However, (13) is negative also with a high h and [(t − s )θ A At + θ ] > 0,
such that terms C and E are negative and thus F is positive. In this case, if part II
dominates part I in absolute value, or when part I is negative, (13) is negative.
In sum, for sufficiently low h, ∂ 2 t D /(∂τ∂γ ) < 0, such that the effect of trade
integration on the pollution tax is increasing with political stability. For other values of
h, we know only that ∂ 2 t D /(∂τ∂γ ) ≠ 0, i.e. the effect of trade integration on the
pollution tax is conditional on political stability. ■
The intuition is the following.16 (i) In this model, trade integration (a cut in the
tariff rate) has two effects on environmental policy, and their size both depend on the
degree of political stability. Term A in the numerator of (12) represents the reduction in
the producers’ incentive to seek a lower pollution tax as a result of trade integration
16

The result is independent of environmental policy instrument used. With an emissions standard, trade
integration would still result in a “bribery reduction effect” and a “welfare effect”. Revenues do not drive
our result. Note that an identical result is obtained if the trade policy used is an export subsidy.
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(note from (9) that term A is the second derivative Ω tFτ ) . When output shrinks, less is at
stake for the lobby in the political process. Thus, the bribe offer is reduced, and the
pollution tax rises through this channel. We denote this the “bribery reduction effect”
of trade integration.
Term B in the numerator of (12) reflects the change in the government’s
incentive to tax pollution for welfare reasons (note from (10) that term B is the second
derivative Ω tAτ ) . As discussed above, the tariff introduces distortions in production and
consumption, and increases the aggregate level of pollution damage. In this small open
economy, only one policy instrument is available to address these distortions: the
pollution tax. As discussed above, the second-best pollution tax therefore exceeds
marginal damage, i.e. t * > s. Trade integration reduces the marginal incentive to tax
pollution for this reason. However, the net effect on the pollution tax is ambiguous,
because of taxpayers’ interest in tax revenues and the effect on profits. We denote this
the “welfare effect” of trade integration.17 If term B in (12) positive, the relative
importance of the two effects (represented by terms A and B in (12), respectively)
depends on the degree of honesty, h. In particular, when the degree of government
honesty is low (corruption is high) such that h < {θ [γ + (1 − γ )λ ]}/ {γ [(t − s )θ A At + θ ]},
the bribery reduction effect dominates the welfare effect and trade integration raises the
pollution tax. If term B is negative, trade integration unambiguously raises the pollution
tax.
(ii) The two effects discussed above are adjusted for the probability of
successful eventual policy implementation, reflected by the level of political stability,
γ . Bribery and social welfare are important (to the lobby and the government,
respectively) only as long as the government stays in power long enough to deliver and
reap the benefit of its policy choice. In addition, the lobby also benefits from bribery to
the extent that a new government would implement the policy paid for (without extra
cost), which occurs with probability (1 − γ )λ.
Changes in γ affect ∂t D / ∂τ both via its impact on the “bribery reduction
effect” and on the “welfare effect”. For low government honesty, h, terms B, C, and D
in (13) are all positive, and thus (13) is negative. In this case, the effect of γ occurs via
the “bribery reduction effect”, since welfare in this case is of minor importance. The
main effect is here that political stability raises the lobby’s incentive to offer a sizeable
bribe. Changes in this incentive due to trade integration are therefore more pronounced
with greater political stability.
For high levels of honesty, all terms in (13) have ambiguous sign, and the
relative impact of political stability on the (i) bribery reduction effect and (ii) the
welfare effect determines the sign of ∂ 2 t D /(∂τ∂γ ). Greater political stability implies
17

Note that since trade integration shrinks the pollution intensive sector, environmental damage falls,
given the pollution tax. A falling pollution tax would therefore not necessarily be welfare-reducing. Our
focus is on the determination of the pollution tax, however, and we abstract from welfare issues in this
paper.
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that social welfare is of greater concern to the incumbent government. As discussed
above, trade integration lowers the incentive to tax pollution for second-best welfare
reasons, and this incentive-reducing effect is relatively stronger where political stability
is high.
3. Empirical Specification and Data

The theoretical model developed in the previous sections yields testable
implications of the relationships between trade openness (trade integration), political
stability, and environmental policy formation, expressed in Proposition 1. Our objective
is to test these implications using cross-country data on environmental policy.
Proposition 1 shows that for low levels of government honesty, trade integration raises
environmental policy stringency, and this effect is stronger the greater the degree of
political stability. However, the same outcome may occur also for high levels of
honesty, and our empirical work will also seek to determine the sensitivity of our results
to the level of government honesty.
The empirical estimation can be formulated as follows,
(14)

ti = x′iβx + βγγi + β τ τ i−1 + βγ τ γi τ i−1 + βhhi + εi,

where ti is the stringency of environmental policy in country i, xi is a vector of controls,
γi is the degree of political stability, τ i−1 is the degree of trade openness (the inverted
tariff rate), hi is government honesty (absence of corruption), and εi is a zero mean error
term. Whereas βγ, β τ , βγ τ and βh are coefficient scalars, βx is a coefficient vector.
We now describe the variables used to test the prediction generated by our theory.
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of variables used in the regression. Table
A.1 in the Appendix contains a further description of the data and sources.
Our measure of the stringency of environmental regulations is a sub-index from the
2001 Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) developed by CIESIN (2001). We
employ one of the core indicators as our measure of the stringency of environmental
policies for 2000, which we denote Environmental Stringency. This is an aggregation
of various indicators consisting of regulation and management, private sector
responsiveness, science and technology, capacity for debate, environmental
information, and eco-efficiency. It captures the extent to which the country has in place
institutions and policies that result in effective responses to environmental problems
(i.e., laws on the book, implementation, monitoring, and enforcement). It takes values
between 0 and 100, where a higher value implies greater environmental policy
stringency.18

18

To our knowledge, our dependent variable is the best measure of environmental policy stringency
available for a large number of countries during the time period studied.
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Table 1.A. Descriptive Statistics: Full Sample
Variable
Environmental Stringency
Log (GDP)
Openness
Dishonesty
Honesty
Political Stability
% Non-Ag Labor
Economic Freedom
Democracy
Federal
War Dummy
Civil War Dummy
Common Law
Racial Tension
Ethno-religious
Fractionalization
Ethno-linguistic
Fractionalization
Civic Freedom
Dismag

Number of
Observ.
118
114
113
77
113
113
117
99
86
86
98
98
86
87
97

Mean

Minimum

Maximum

46.94
8.37
2.78
5.32
0.02
0.06
63.06
6.60
0.23
0.20
0.30
0.27
0.29
3.72
0.44

Standard
Deviation
18.38
1.09
1.19
2.35
0.91
0.82
27.57
1.41
0.42
0.40
0.46
0.44
0.46
1.62
0.23

18.1
6.2
1.0
0.0
-1.6
-2.4
5.9
3.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

92.3
10.3
5.0
8.3
2.1
1.7
98.8
9.1
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
6.0
0.9

98

0.33

0.30

0.0

0.9

118
77

3.51
0.55

1.64
0.39

1.0
0.0

7.0
1.0

Table 1.B. Descriptive Statistics: Developing Country Sample
Variable
Environmental Stringency
Log (GDP)
Openness
Dishonesty
Honesty
Political Stability
% Non-Ag Labor
Economic Freedom
Democracy
Federal
War Dummy
Civil War Dummy
Common Law
Racial Tension
Ethno-religious
Fractionalization
Ethno-linguistic
Fractionalization
Civic Freedom
Dismag

Number of
Observ.
92
88
87
51
87
87
92
73
60
60
72
72
60
61
71

Mean

Minimum

Maximum

39.63
7.96
2.43
6.53
-0.35
-0.21
56.38
6.10
0.05
0.13
0.38
0.33
0.33
3.25
0.49

Standard
Deviation
10.98
0.85
1.13
1.27
0.55
0.67
26.91
1.25
0.22
0.34
0.49
0.47
0.48
1.51
0.22

18.1
6.2
1.0
2.7
-1.6
-2.4
5.9
3.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

72.9
9.8
5.0
8.3
1.3
1.1
98.8
8.4
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
6.0
0.9

72

0.40

0.31

0.0

0.9

92
51

4.01
0.53

1.43
0.40

2.0
0.0

7.0
1.0
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Political stability is not directly observable. However, a measure of political
stability has been developed by Kaufmann et al. (1999a, 1999b) for the years 1997-98.
The Political Stability index combines several indicators seeking to measure
perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or
overthrown. It takes values from –2.5 to 2.5, where a higher value represents greater
political stability. We also use Racial Tension as an alternate measure of political (in)stability (Knack and Keefer, 1995). It is an index for countries experiencing racial
tension and takes values from 1 (high tension) to 6 (low tension).
Our trade openness measure is an index developed by the Heritage Foundation
and the Wall Street Journal (O'Driscoll et al., 2000) (Openness). An economy earns a
5 if it has an average tariff rate of ≤4% and/or has very few non-tariff barriers, and a 1 if
the average tariff rate is >19% and/or there are very high non-tariff barriers that
virtually prohibit imports. Thus, we expect that Openness will take a positive sign. We
also use a more comprehensive (general) measure of economic liberalization and
openness, the Economic Freedom index, compiled by the Fraser Institute (Gwartney et
al., 2000). The Economic Freedom index is a composite index of ten individual
indices for 1997. It takes values between 0 and 10, where a higher value for the index
indicates a greater degree of economic liberalization and freedom.
A main implication of our theory is that the effect of trade integration is
conditional on the degree of political stability. We therefore include the relevant
interaction variables Openness×Political Stability and Economic Freedom×Political
Stability.
We have two proxies for government honesty. One is an index developed by
Kaufmann et al. (1999a, 1999b), Honesty.19 It measures perceptions of honesty in
government in a country, or more precisely, the absence of the use of public power for
private gain. The index takes values from –2.5 to 2.5, where a higher value implies
more honesty, and thus we expect a positive sign. Our second government honesty
measure is the Corruption Perceptions Index (Dishonesty) developed by Transparency
International, which measures the “perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by
business people, risk analysts, and the general public.” The index is computed as the
sample average of a number of different surveys assessing each country’s performance.
Dishonesty ranges between 0 (perfectly clean) and 10 (highly corrupt).20 We expect a
negative sign.
Proposition 1 suggests that the level of government honesty may play a role for
the effect of openness on environmental policy, and the interaction effect with -political
stability. To investigate the impact of government honesty on the relationships of
interest, we therefore experiment with different cut-off values for Honesty.
19

The indicator reflects the statistical compilation of perceptions of the quality of governance of a large
number of survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as well as non-governmental
organizations, commercial risk rating agencies, and think tanks during 1997 and 1998.
20
The index is inverted in the scale from the original data by subtracting values from 10 to make results
more intuitive. A number of recent empirical studies of corruption have employed this index, including
Persson et al. (2000), Fisman and Gatti (2002), and Fredriksson et al. (2004).
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Given the possible endogeneity of the Honesty, Political Stability, and
Openness variables, OLS is expected to lead to biased results. We therefore test for the
necessity of an instrumental variable approach (whether the set of estimates obtained by
least squares are consistent or not) by using an augmented regression test (the DurbinWu-Hausman test) (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). This is carried out by including
the residuals of each endogenous right-hand side variable as a function of all exogenous
variables in a regression of the original model.21 A smaller p-value for Honesty and
Political Stability in our model indicates that they are endogenous and that OLS is
inconsistent. However, trade openness was found to be exogenous and hence can be
treated as predetermined. We correct for the endogeneity of corruption and political
stability by using Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS). We also test for possible
heteroskedasticity and correct it using White’s correction.22
Our theoretical model, as well as the previous empirical literature (see, for
example, Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003), is informative concerning control variables
to include in regression (14). Two sets of controls capture demand factors and
structural features of an economy that may influence environmental policy in alternative
ways that are not the focus of the present paper. We thus include the log of purchasing
power adjusted per capita GDP, Log GDP.
Industrial environmental policies are also influenced by the workers employed
in polluting sectors. The greater their stake in the policy outcome, the greater their
political pressure and success. However, Olson’s (1965) theory of free-riding implies
that political influence may decline as the size of an interest group increases. We use the
proportion of the total labor force working in non-agricultural sectors (% Non-Ag.
Labor) as our measure of worker political pressure on industry environmental policies.
The labor force here comprises all individuals who meet the International Labor
Organization’s definition of the economically active population. The expected sign is
indeterminate. The remaining control variable seeks to adjust for structural differences
between countries.23
Given the endogeneity of Honesty, Dishonesty and Political Stability, we use a
number of instrumental variables to test and correct for the bias. For example, La Porta
et al. (1999), Fisman and Gatti (2002), and Persson et al. (2003) discuss factors
determining corruption. We model the determinants of government honesty into two
main categories, namely standard economic controls, and political and legal history.
Based on the literature, we selected the following instruments: a dummy for common
law system (Legal Origin) from La Porta et al. (1999) (also used by Fredriksson and
Svensson, 2003), an indicator of the federal nature of government (Federation) (see
Fisman and Gatti, 2002), and a variable measuring electoral district magnitudes
21

This is an augmented form of the Hausman test for contemporaneous correlation between the error term
and the regressors, used to test exogeneity of variables (Hausman, 1983).
22
See White (1980) and Greene (1997) for White’s correction to standard errors for an unknown form of
heteroskedasticity.
23
We do not include a measure of the marginal damage from pollution since this will be determined by
environmental policy.
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(Dismag). Dismag comes from Persson et al. (2003) who argue that electoral
competition becomes stiffer in countries with single-member districts than in countries
with a single nation-wide district. As a result, candidates become more focused and
disciplined and hence demonstrate less rent seeking behavior and more honesty.
We hypothesize that political stability is to a large extent a function of the
prevailing economic, political and social factors. We use Racial Tension, Ethnoreligious Fractionalization, dummies for countries with recent history of War and
Civil War as our instruments for Political Stability. The test of over-identifying
restrictions was applied to the various sets of instruments. It indicates that our
instruments are valid.24
4. Empirical Results

We empirically test our model for a sample of 118 countries for which the
Environmental Stringency variable is available, of which 92 are non-OECD countries.
Table 2 presents the first-stage regressions for Dishonesty, Honesty, and Political
Stability, identifying various instruments. They are able to explain a large portion of
the variation in Dishonesty, Honesty, and Political Stability. A number of instruments
are significant at conventional levels, in addition to the level of income (Log GDP).
Dishonesty is driven by the degree of decentralized structure of government (Federal
Dummy), consistent with the literature suggesting that a federal structural of
government adds further layers of bureaucracy and increases rent seeking opportunities.
The existence of common law system (Legal Origin) appears to reduce Dishonesty
levels, consistent with earlier research findings which suggest that ‘civil law’ countries
with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, less consistency, less fairness in
judicial decisions and more corruption compared with ‘common law’ countries (see
Djankov et al., 2002).25 The Honesty equation suggests that curtailing basic civic rights
may reduce government honesty by vesting power in a few hands.
Political Stability appears to be associated primarily with low levels of ethnoreligious fractionalization and racial tension, and higher levels of economic
development. This is consistent with the literature which argues that that ethnic and
religious fractionalization proxies for the degree of conflict in society, which fuels
political instability (see Annet, 2001).
The estimation results for the Environmental Stringency equation for the full
sample are presented in Table 3. The models contain estimates from both OLS and
2SLS regressions using different controls. The OLS results are presented for
comparison. The results suggest that the point estimates for our key variables such as
Openness and Political Stability are more robust and significant at higher levels when
24

The order condition necessary for identification is satisfied since the Dishonesty, Honesty and
Political Stability equations are over-identified.
25
La Porta et al. (1999) and Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) have previously found that legal origin is a
good instrument for the degree of corruption.
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Table 2: First Stage Regressions
Variable
Dishonesty
Log GDP

Honesty

-2.04
(6.1)***

0.91
(7.2)***

0.01
(0.4)
-0.09
(0.6)
0.69
(1.8)*

-0.007
(1.2)
0.06
(1.0)
-0.17
(1.18)

War Dummy
Civil War Dummy
Ethno-religious
Fractionalization
% Non-Ag. Labor
Openness
Federal Dummy

17

Political
Stability
0.44
(3.4)***
-0.17
(1.3)
-0.21
(1.1)
0.74
(2.8)***
-0.002
(0.4)
0.04
(0.6)

0.14
(2.6)***

Racial Tension

-0.13
(0.7)
0.46
Legal Origin
(3.1)***
0.32
Civic Freedom
(2.0)*
-7.38
-4.34
23.3
Constant
(9.61)***
(5.3)***
(11.0)***
0.716
0.750
0.585
R2
77
79
87
Observations
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. *(**) [***] statistically significant at the 10 (5) [1]
percent level.
Dismag

-0.10
(0.2)
-1.44
(3.8)***

the endogeneity is taken into account.26 The results support our theory and the estimates
appear robust under alternate specifications. Moreover, all variables that are
statistically significant have the expected sign.
The Openness and Economic Freedom variables are significant across most
models, indicating that countries with more liberal trade policies, which are more
economically integrated with the rest of the world, tend to set more stringent
environmental policies. First, protection tends to worsen pollution because it stimulates
output. Tariff reduction (Openness) by itself reduces output and pollution, which makes
26

As Table 2 reveals, we are able to explain a large portion of the variation in Dishonesty and Political
Stability in our first stage regressions.
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it less profitable to bribe the government to reduce stringency. Thus, the “bribery
reduction effect” of trade openness is to make environmental policy more stringent. In
the opposite direction, because openness reduces the need for domestic production of
the polluting good, the “welfare effect” means a lower need for stringent environmental
policy. The empirical finding is that liberal trade policies lead to more stringent
environmental policies. This indicates that the bribery reduction effect of trade
integration dominates the welfare effect.
To gain an understanding of the full effect of trade openness on environmental
policy, we need to consider the interaction effect identified by our theory. The
interaction variables Openness×Political Stability and Economic Freedom×Political
Table 3: Environmental Stringency Regressions (OLS and 2SLS)
Variable
OLS
2SLS
5.39
4.42
4.07
3.15
3.18
3.80
1.91
Log GDP
(2.3)** (2.6)** (2.1)**
(1.5)
(0.8)
(1.0)
(0.4)
-4.05
-4.99
-2.10
-4.52
-3.42
Dishonesty
***
***
***
**
(6.6)
(9.3)
(1.1)
(7.3)
(2.4)
12.75
8.86
Honesty
***
(7.8)
(2.2)**
-0.11
-0.06
-0.01
-0.05
-0.02
-0.03
-0.11
% Non-Ag.
*
**
(2.3)
(1.0)
(0.2)
(0.5)
(0.3)
(0.0)
(1.7)
Labor
2.26
-0.98
3.74
2.73
3.71
Openness
**
***
**
(2.1)
(0.6)
(2.3)
(3.5)
(2.3)**
2.95
3.86
Economic
***
(3.2)
(3.6)***
Freedom
-6.10
-20.77 -51.33
-20.3
-10.72
-17.62
Political
**
***
**
***
***
(7.8)
(3.9)
(4.6)
(3.8)***
(2.3)
(2.3)
Stability
-3.83
Racial Tension
(2.7)***
2.34
8.38
8.17
3.82
Openness×
***
**
***
(2.2)
(4.8)
(4.6)***
Polit. Stability (2.9)
2.68
7.99
Ec. Freedom×
(2.5)**
(5.2)***
Polit. Stability
1.23
Openness×
(2.8)***
Racial Tension
29.70
31.7
1.82
19.0
8.47
21.77
56.18
Constant
(1.7)*
(0.9)
(0.0)
(0.6)
(2.2)**
(1.6) (3.5)***
0.870
0.853
0.879
0.884
0.818
0.856
0.816
R2
76
107
74
69
68
68
68
Observations
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. *(**) [***] statistically significant at the 10 (5) [1]
percent level.
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Stability are positive and significant in all models. Thus, the effect of Openness is
conditional on the level of Political Stability. As the degree of trade integration rises,
so does the stringency of environmental policy, and this is particularly true in
politically stable countries. The reduction of industry bribery as a result of trade
integration is particularly strong when influence-seeking and bribery takes place under
predictable (stable) political conditions. Using Racial Tension as a proxy for political
(in-)stability in the fourth column, our results largely continue to hold.
Openness×Racial Tension is significant, although Openness becomes insignificant
when this interaction term is included.
To see the complete effect of Political Stability, we also need to consider its
interactions. For example, using the estimates from the 5th model (5th column) of Table
3 (2SLS), we find that ∂Environmental Stringency/∂Political Stability = 2.53 (= 20.77 + 8.38×2.78) (evaluated at the mean of Openness). That is, political stability is
Table 4: Environmental Stringency Regressions: Developing Countries
Variable
OLS
2SLS
2.73
2.91
3.52
2.58
4.82
Log GDP
(1.2)
(1.4)
(0.8)
(0.5)
(1.9)*
-4.3
-4.14
-2.74
-2.85
-4.16
Dishonesty
(4.8)***
(5.6)***
(1.6)
(1.3)
(4.4)***
-0.13
-0.07
-0.03
-0.05
-0.04
% Non-Ag. Labor
(1.9)*
(1.3)
(0.5)
(0.5)
(0.3)
-0.27
5.14
2.98
Openness
(0.2)
(3.2)***
(2.7)***
3.52
4.08
Economic Freedom
(3.2)***
(2.9)***
-17.89
-17.90
-48.48
-8.63
Political Stability
(2.1)**
(3.0)***
(3.4)***
(1.7)*
-3.94
Racial Tension
(2.9)***
3.05
6.73
Openness×
*
**
(1.8)
(2.5)
Political Stability
2.49
7.44
Economic Freedom×
*
(2.0)
(3.5)***
Political Stability
1.31
Openness×
(2.7)***
Racial Tension
31.4
30.58
51.97
22.34
15.78
Constant
(1.5)
(2.0)*
(3.0)***
(0.6)
(0.3)
2
0.761
0.781
0.817
0.738
0.733
R
52
50
46
45
45
Observations
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. *(**) [***] statistically significant at the 10 (5) [1]
percent level.
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associated with greater environmental policy stringency, except in relatively closed
economies (where the total marginal effect turns negative).
Turning to our control variables, Dishonesty and Honesty are significant across
the models with the expected signs, suggesting that lower levels of corruption are
associated with stricter environmental policies. Log GDP is significant in only some of
the OLS regressions, as is % Non-Ag. Labor.27 This may suggest that the variables of
main interest are relatively important determinants of environmental policy.28
Table 4 replicates Table 3 using only the developing country observations.
Policy advice may have particular relevance for this group of countries. In addition, this
group of countries has a lower average of Honesty, and these regressions may
consequently shed some light on the role of the honesty variable for the direction of the
interaction in focus (see the discussion in connection with Proposition 1). We find that
Openness and Economic Freedom are associated with more stringent environmental
policies in developing countries, and again this is particularly the case where political
Table 5: Environmental Stringency Regressions: Varying Corruption Levels
OLS
2SLS
Sample Range
5-10
4-10
2-10
5-10
4-10
2-10
Dishonesty Index
5.30
5.20
5.83
1.51
0.75
2.22
Log GDP
(2.36)**
(2.4)**
(2.6)**
(0.3)
(0.2)
(0.5)
-1.91
-1.89
-3.92
-2.10
-2.3
-3.1
Dishonesty
(1.3)
(1.5)
(4.2)*
(1.0)
(1.5)
(2.0)**
-0.10
-0.12
-0.02
0.01
-0.01
-0.12
% Non-Ag. Labor
(1.6)
(1.8)*
(0.3)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(1.7)*
2.60
2.36
3.46
3.70
4.01
2.90
Openness
(2.7)**
(2.3)**
(3.1)*** (3.3)*** (3.2)***
(2.9)***
-8.51
-8.35
-9.92
-12.1
-12.0
-17.5
Political Stability
(1.6)
(1.8)**
(2.0)**
(3.0)*** (3.0)*** (3.9)***
3.60
3.53
3.57
3.90
3.96
5.98
Openness×
(2.3)**
(2.60)** (2.60)** (3.0)*** (3.1)*** (3.8)***
Political Stability
12.0
12.7
22.3
35.0
41.2
34.2
Constant
(0.7)
(0.7)
(1.2)
(0.8)
(1.1)
(0.9)
0.526
0.591
0.742
0.561
0.585
0.721
R2
50
58
65
42
49
56
Observations
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. *(**) [***] statistically significant at the 10 (5) [1]
percent level.

27

To adjust for structural differences between countries, we also tried including an OECD country
dummy. This was insignificant in all regressions.
28
This can also be interpreted that the traditional Kuznets type results may not hold when structural
variables such as dishonesty and political stability are controlled for. This is a topic for future research.
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stability is high. The only difference between Tables 3 and 4 appear to be that
Dishonesty is insignificant in both 2SLS models, possibly due to insufficient variation.
To further explore the impact of honesty for our main results, we performed a
sensitivity analysis for our regressions of main interest. The samples used in Table 5 are
determined by the countries’ Dishonesty scores. We used three different cut-off levels
of Dishonesty (i) 5-10; (ii) 4-10; (iii) 2-10, where the first sample contains only the
most dishonest countries. Table 5 reveals that our main results appear quite insensitive
to the Dishonesty scores. Openness and its interaction with Political Stability remain
significant and positive in all models. Dishonesty is here significant only in the largest
samples (including countries with Dishonesty index 2-10).
5. Conclusion

This paper develops a theory of how environmental policy formation is affected
by the degree of economic integration and the level of political turbulence. The
prediction that emerges is that trade integration is associated with stricter environmental
policies in countries with relatively corrupt governments, and this effect may occur also
in less corrupt countries. Moreover, the theory predicts an interaction effect between the
degree of trade integration and the level of political stability.
These predictions are supported by our empirical findings from developed and
developing countries. Trade integration leads to more stringent environmental policies,
and the effect is greater in politically stable countries. Our findings suggest that
predictions of environmental policy outcomes in connection to trade reform programs
should take the degree of political stability into account.
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Appendix
Table A.1. Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Variable
Definition and Source
Captures the extent to which the country has in place institutions and policies that
Environresult in effective responses to environmental problems. It takes values between 0 and
mental
Stringency 100, where a higher value implies greater environmental policy stringency. Source:
GDP

Dishonesty

Honesty

Political
Stability
Openness

% NonAg. Labor
Economic
Freedom
Racial
Tension
Dismag
Federal
Dummy
Legal
Origin
Civic
Freedom
War
Dummy
Civil War
Dummy

Center for International Earth Science Information Network (2001), www.ciesin.org.
GDP Per Capita (PPP) or Purchasing power adjusted GDP is obtained when GDP is
converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates.
An
international dollar thus has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar in
the United States. Source: World Development Indicators (2000).
Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International, describes the
level of perceived corruption in the public sector using a poll of political risk indexes.
Original scores range from 0 (completely corrupt) to 10 (clean). Average of CPI
indexes for years 1997, 1998, and 1999. The index is inverted in scale by subtracting
values from 10 to make the results more intuitive. Available at: www.transparency.de.
Measures perceptions of honesty (absence of corruption) corruption in a country, or
more precisely, the absence of the use of public power for private gain. The index
takes values from –2.5 to 2.5, where a higher value implies greater control over
corruption. Source: Kaufmann et al. (1999a, 1999b).
Measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be
destabilized or overthrown. Takes values from –2.5 to 2.5, where a higher value
represents greater political stability. Source: Kaufmann et al. (1999a, 1999b).
Index of trade openness developed by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street
Journal. Takes values from 1 to 5. An economy earns a "5" if it has average tariff rate
of less than or equal to 4 percentage points and/or has very few non-tariff barriers, and
"1" if the average tariff rate is greater than 19% and/or there are very high non-tariff
barriers that virtually prohibits imports. Source: O'Driscoll et al. (2000).
Proportion of the total labor force recorded as working in non-agricultural sectors.
Source: World Development Indicators (2000).
Measure of economic liberalization and openness. A composite index of ten individual
indices for 1997. Takes values between 0 and 10, where a higher value indicates a
greater degree of economic liberalization and freedom. Source: Gwartney et al. (2000).
Index for countries experiencing racial tension. It takes values from 1 (high tension) to
6 (low tension). Source: Knack and Keefer (1995).
A measure of the average number of representatives elected in each district taking
values between 0 and 1. 0 represents a system with only single-member districts, 1 a
system with a single electoral district. Persson et al. (2003).
Federal structure dummy variable. It takes the value 1 for federation, and 0 otherwise.
Legal Origin Dummy taking the value 1 for countries with history of Anglo-Saxon
Common Law, and 0 otherwise. Source: La Porta et al. (1999).
Index that indicates the freedom enjoyed by the civil society. Take a value from 1
(most free) to 7 (least free). Source: Gwartney et al. (2000).
Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the country was involved in at least one
incidence of war in the last 30 years, 0 otherwise. Source: Knack and Keefer (1995).
Civil war dummy variable taking the value 1 if the country experienced civil war in the
last 30 years, 0 otherwise. Source: Knack and Keefer (1995).
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